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Abstract
In their recent article Roache and Gostin outline why governments and public health advocates should embrace 
soda taxes. The evidence is strong and continues to grow: such taxes can change consumer behavior, generate 
significant revenue and incentivize product reformulation. In essence, such taxes are an important and now 
well-established instrument of fiscal and public health policy. In this commentary we expand on their arguments 
by considering how the worldwide adoption of such taxes might be further accelerated. First, we identify where 
in the world taxes have been implemented to date and where the untapped potential remains greatest. Second, 
drawing upon recent case study research on country experiences we describe several conditions under which 
governments may be more likely to make taxation a political priority in the future. Third, we consider how to 
help strengthen the technical and legal capacities of governments to design and effectively administer taxes, 
with emphasis on low- and middle-income countries. We expect the findings to be most useful to public health 
advocates and policy-makers seeking to promote healthier diets and good nutrition.
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Introduction
Roache and Gostin’s article in this journal presents a 
compelling rationale for why governments and public health 
advocates should embrace soda taxes.1 A strong and growing 
body of evidence demonstrates that such taxes can change 
consumer behavior, generate significant revenue for cash-
strapped governments, and incentivize product reformulation 
by manufacturers. The recent addition of sugar-sweetened 
beverage (SSB) taxes to the menu of policies recommended 
in the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) Global Action 
Plan for the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable 
Diseases 2013-2020, further recognizes this evidence and 
adds to a growing global mandate for action.2 
In this commentary we expand on Roache and Gostin’s 
arguments by considering how the worldwide adoption of 
such taxes might be further accelerated through strategic 
action by public health actors. The term ‘soda’ may be easier 
to explain to general audiences,3 but for the purpose of this 
paper we adopt SSBs to acknowledge the broader range of 
products taxed in many jurisdictions (eg, juices, milk-based 
beverages and non-carbonated drinks) and because tax 
policies with a public health purpose should ideally apply to 
all possible beverage substitutes.4
Where Is the Untapped Public Health Potential Greatest?
Roache and Gostin provide selected country examples where 
public-health taxes on SSBs have already been enacted. 
Encouragingly, the full list is in fact far greater and growing. It 
now includes 19 countries (with six soon to follow), and nine 
US municipalities (Figure 1). Most of these countries have 
higher than average obesity rates, particularly in the Pacific 
and Caribbean. Several are also world-leaders in per capita 
volumes of calories purchased from SSBs, notably Saudi 
Arabia (145.7 kcal/capita/day), Chile (160.8 kcal), and Mexico 
(148 kcal).5 Experts recommend that taxation rates should 
be set at non-trivial levels (ie, 10%-20% or higher) to have 
meaningful impacts on consumer behavior. However, most 
jurisdictions are well below the mark indicating significant 
potential for further increases.6-8
Outside of these countries where is the untapped public health 
potential for SSBs greatest? One approach is to identify the 
countries with high levels of calories purchased from SSBs but 
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with no tax in place. To do this we used market sales data5 and 
a method used by others in analyses of ultra-processed food 
and beverage markets.8,10 This identifies Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovakia, and the United States (Figure 2) among 
others. Another approach is to consider countries with large 
population sizes where even small reductions in per capita 
SSB consumption could lead to significant population health 
gains. Among highly populated middle-income countries 
(>50 million people) only Mexico, Egypt, and South Africa 
have enacted SSB taxes. Brazil and several other Latin 
American countries, the Philippines and Thailand standout 
with high levels of calories purchased from SSBs but without 
taxes yet in place.
Under What Conditions Are Governments More Likely to 
Adopt and Sustain SSB Taxes?
Recent case studies involving several of the jurisdictions with 
SSB taxes in place provide valuable lessons for public health 
advocates and policy-makers looking to follow suit. Political 
science theories and studies on the determinants of political 
priority for health issues also offer important insights.11,12 In 
this section we summarize some key findings.
Financial reform and/or fiscal need as policy windows: The 
ideological persuasion of government does not appear 
to influence the likelihood of tax adoption, having been 
almost equally as common under more left-wing (eg, 
social-democratic) as under more right-wing (eg, liberal-
conservative) governments.13 What appears to be most 
important is a government commitment to financial reform 
and/or moments of fiscal need when governments are 
favorable to adopting new revenue streams. For example, 
previous taxes have been adopted within broader tax system 
reforms (eg, Mexico, South Africa), to address budgetary 
shortfalls during financial crisis (eg, Hungary), and to off-
Figure 1. Jurisdictions With Existing (Dark Grey) and Forthcoming (Light Grey) SSB Taxes.
Note: This figure was prepared using data from the NOURISHING database,9 academic references and market reports. Given the rapid 
development of policies and involvement of multiple levels of government, it may not include all jurisdictions with health-related SSB taxes.
Abbreviation: SSB, sugar-sweetened beverage.
Figure 2. Calories Sold Per Capita Per Day From SSBs Versus GDP 
Per Capita in Largest Markets With an Existing Tax or Soon to Adopt 
a Tax (Black Dots), and Those Without (White Dots).
Note: This figure was prepared using data from the Euromonitor 
Passport Nutrition database5 and a method used in earlier studies8,10; 
GDP per capita is given as PPP and in 2015 international dollars to 
allow for comparability between countries.
Abbreviations: GDP, Gross domestic product; PPP, purchasing power 
parity; SSBs, Sugar-Sweetened Beverages.
set tariff-revenue reductions following trade liberalization 
(eg, Fiji).13 Similar situations are likely to present significant 
windows of opportunity for tax proponents. They might 
find influence with powerful finance actors (eg, ministries 
of finance) when highlighting the revenue-raising potential 
of SSB taxes, including for the purpose of broadening health 
systems financing models.14 Or, as in the case of Mexico,15 
when they are capable of sensitizing financial policy reform 
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agendas to public health nutrition objectives. 
Framing: Certain messages (ie, frames) appear to be effective 
in raising awareness and generating support for SSB taxes in 
different contexts. In addition to highlighting their revenue-
raising potential, framing taxes as a health promotion 
measure may generate further political support.16,17 For 
example, in Mexico, a multi-pronged media campaign 
highlighting the health and economic burden of obesity and 
diabetes, the uniquely harmful contribution of SSBs to these 
problems, and the presentation of evidence-based solutions 
with an emphasis on tax adoption were influential with the 
general public and legislators.15 More immediate and graphic 
harms of SSBs on dental health in both adults and children 
may also be persuasive in making the case for action to 
policy-makers. Support also tends to increase when there is 
a clear commitment to earmark tax revenues for health and/
or other social initiatives.3,13,16,17 Within the framework of the 
Sustainable Development Goals and United Nations Decade 
of Action on Nutrition there are many potential targets for 
hypothecation (eg, universal coverage of essential nutrition 
actions, food distribution and social protection programs, 
water and sanitation initiatives and so on).18 Pro-tax messages 
may have greater salience when they come from trusted 
sources (eg, well-regarded public-interest organizations, 
celebrities such as Jamie Oliver, or local community 
members),3,13,15 and when highlighting the predatory nature 
of soda industry marketing practices on children.11,13,19 
Civil society mobilization: In several (but not all) cases 
proponents of soda taxes have established broad-based 
advocacy coalitions to raise public awareness, pool resources 
and generate stronger leverage with decision-makers. Such 
coalitions can draw upon a diversity of strategies and tactics. 
In Mexico, for example, an alliance of advocacy organizations, 
professional lobbyists and academic institutions initiated a 
multi-pronged media campaign to influence public opinion, 
developed evidence-based framing strategies, and lobbied 
government officials and newly-elected legislators. This 
coalition drew upon the financial and technical support 
of key international organizations including Bloomberg 
Philanthropies, the Pan American Health Organization, and 
the WHO. Research institutions played a key role in generating 
and synthesizing evidence, including the evaluation of tax 
effectiveness.15
Anticipating and countering opposition: As Roache and 
Gostin point-out SSB industries have powerfully impeded 
support for taxes in many jurisdictions. This includes 
direct lobbying of legislators, legal challenges prior to and 
following tax implementation, and anti-tax media campaigns 
emphasizing the anticipated harms to business and jobs, and 
anti-government (eg, nanny-state) sentiments. Arguments 
put forward mirror those of the tobacco industry.20 These 
strategies are to some extent predictable and may be 
countered. For example, another industry strategy is the 
framing of soda taxes as regressive (ie, as unfairly burdening 
low-income groups). Several evidence-based frames may be 
deployed by tax proponents to counter such arguments, for 
example: earmarking revenues for targeted health and social 
spending can off-set any regressive impacts of a SSB tax on 
low-income groups13,16,21; designing taxes so as to incentivize 
product reformulation (eg, as in the case of the UK SSB levy) 
can reduce the cost passed onto consumers and delivers 
benefits across the population equitably16; and the health and 
economic burden of SSBs on low-income consumers is even 
more regressive than SSB taxation.3
Strengthening Capacities to Design and Implement Effective 
Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Taxes
Governments must have the commitment to implement 
SSB taxes. But they must also have the capacity to design 
and effectively administer them. Here we consider potential 
technical and legal capacity challenges and how public health 
actors might support governments in overcoming them.
Technical capacities: The design of SSB tax systems can 
present several technical challenges for governments. 
Key considerations for increasing tax effectiveness and 
survivability include the establishment of clear policy 
objectives, demarcation of taxable product categories with 
links to available evidence, the administrative complexity and 
effectiveness of different tax structures (ie, adopting specific 
excise taxes, ad-valorem excise taxes and value-added taxes 
separately or in combination), administrative capacities of 
implementing agencies, and the establishment of robust 
monitoring and evaluation systems.13,21,22 Roache and Gostin 
point out the WHO’s important role in providing technical 
assistance, and sharing information and country experiences. 
Recent technical reports provide a strong foundation here.7,21 
Future activities might include the development of clear 
guidance on the implementation of price and tax measures 
for SSBs specifically and/or healthy diets more broadly (eg, 
similar to Article 6 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control). The World Bank can also play an important role 
given its close engagement with ministries of finance and 
its expertise in generating and disseminating evidence.4 
Monitoring and evaluation activities by research institutions 
are particularly important to tax survivability because, as in 
the case of Mexico, evidence demonstrating tax effectiveness 
can be used to counter ongoing opposition.4
Legal capacities: Collaboration with lawyers during the 
design, implementation and evaluation of SSB tax regulations 
can help to ensure that policies not only achieve their health 
objectives, but also comply with domestic and international 
law. The significant funds invested by the beverage industry to 
defeat SSB taxes through litigation thwart or delay progressive 
regulation in both the jurisdiction directly affected and 
beyond by inciting what is sometimes called ‘regulatory 
chill.’ This may be particularly so for low- and middle-
income countries without the legal capacity or financial 
resources to defend such challenges, even where the claims 
made lack merit. Tobacco control experience highlights tax 
opponent’s use of challenges to public health regulations on 
the basis of their failure to comply with relevant procedural or 
administrative requirements in domestic or international law.20 
Understanding these requirements can assist policy-makers 
to comply with due process in making tax regulations, for 
example by allowing appropriate opportunity for consultation, 
or a reasonable period for implementation. 
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Lawyers and public health actors can also collaborate to 
ensure legislation objectives are framed strategically to reflect 
available scientific evidence, and distinctions between taxed 
and non-taxed products (ie, SSB definitions) contained in any 
regulation are defensible on public health grounds.23 Much 
can be gained from sharing regulatory-best practice, for 
example in the way Mexico’s legislation was crafted to ensure 
constitutionality.15 Explicit recognition of the role of SSB 
taxes as only one aspect of comprehensive policies to promote 
healthier diets may also be useful in the event of legal challenge 
that involves a court’s assessment of the policy’s effectiveness. 
Furthermore, positioning SSB taxes within regional and 
global policy frameworks on noncommunicable diseases may 
strengthen both the political and legal mandates for action, 
and contribute evidence of international consensus in the 
event of any legal challenge.24,25 At the same time, different 
legal, economic and social contexts in each jurisdiction will 
mean regulation will require tailoring.25
Conclusion
The untapped potential for accelerating the worldwide 
adoption of SSB taxes is substantial. There is now a strong and 
growing body of evidence on why governments should adopt 
such taxes, particularly with regards to their value as a policy 
instrument for attenuating SSB consumption, raising revenue 
and driving product reformulation. Arguably more attention 
is needed by the public health community with regards to 
how governments might be encouraged and supported to 
implement SSB taxes in the future. Continued capacity-
building efforts and sharing of international best-practice 
will generate a clearer understanding of the conditions 
under which governments are more likely to make SSB tax 
implementation a political priority, and the technical and 
legal capacities required to ensure such policies are effective.
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